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The article examines the tensions involved in the development of treatment for mental 
disorders during the period 1950-1980 in the United States. It relates those tensions to the diffusion of 
a social ideal strongly influenced by the subjectivist fervor characteristic of post-war America but also 
internally contradictory. Psychiatric diagnosis came to be seen as a way of disqualifying the 
individual, and this line of criticism went so far as to question the very existence of mental illness. But 
this context also worked to identify psychic disorder with an incomplete self, so that mental health 
came to be understood as a kind of generic measure of individuality. The article first considers the 
antagonism between these representations as suggested by the effects they had on professionalization 
and the division of labor in the psychiatric field. It then seeks to show how the set of nosographic 
standards that were established at the end of the period—the famous DSM-III—offered a means of 
negotiating and reconciling the different visions of mental disorder, by separating both health and 




Sociology of health has been more interested in studying the effects of medicine than 
accounting for the expectations that led to its extraordinary rise after 1950. Parsons (1951), 
for example, analyzed the integrative function of treatment as a response to the danger of 
marginalization induced by disease. And in a critique often made of psychiatry (Conrad 
1992), sociologists claimed that medical practice was a powerful relay in diffusing stereotypes 
and social domination (Goffman 1961, Goffman 1963, Scheff 1966, Castel 1981). What is 
clear from many of these studies is that medicine’s function after World War II is understood 
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as one of integration or control (Conrad and Schneider 1980), a function external to its direct 
concerns, though what purposes were driving its own development are not explained. The 
expansion of psychiatric treatment after 1950 in the United States, and the concomitant 
protest movement against it, which lasted until the late 1970s, suggest a different angle from 
which to consider medicalization. The expansion of concern about health seems first and 
foremost to echo the particularly subjectivist tone of post-war America. In this context, the 
issues of subjectivity and health seem to have become intertwined. Their relation may be 
described thus:  
 
1) Self-determination and conforming to the self. American subjectivism accepted the 
idea that the individual can conceive thoughts, actions, and aims specific to him or her 
(Baumeister 1987, Danziger 1997). This perspective goes beyond the individualism 
that structures conceptions of citizenship and free trade. In those conceptions, the 
individual is understood to act to his own advantage but he can only choose the most 
profitable option from within the set of constraints and benefits presented by the given 
situation. Contemporary subjectivism is more radical, understanding relation-to-self to 
be sufficient to determine what is most advantageous. Here the idea is that the 
individual need only choose from among the options available to her the one that most 
directly bolsters her singularity (Martin 1981). This perspective condemns negation of 
the individual and encourages personal distinction. Here the individual is not merely 
watching over his own interest, determined consciously, but is also learning to show 
interest in himself as an object worthy of esteem (Mruk 1995). Self-realization and 
conformity to the self thus came to serve not only as a principle for explaining 
behavior, but also as a moral obligation, with the result that each person is required to 
work toward his or her own self-fulfillment (Cushman 1995). 
 
2) Mental health as condition and measure of individuality. The defense of individuality 
favored the expansion of psychiatric treatment as much as it worked against it. What is 
a “sick self”? With regard to insanity in particular, the idea that the self could be sick 
was taken as a contradiction in terms: either the individual is in control of her acts, in 
which case the diagnosis of mental disease seems to involve an arbitrary social 
discrimination; or she is no longer capable of self-determination, in which case the 
disease has annihilated her selfhood. But defense of the self also fueled recognition of 
mental disorder by helping to redefine it. The incomplete self, or insufficient self-
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esteem, was identified as a full-fledged source of distress, even morbidity, that 
required medical or psychotherapeutic treatment. With this connection established, 
mental health was conceived not only as the indispensable condition for personal self-
affirmation but also seemed to represent a means of measuring the degree to which it 
had been realized.  
 
Between 1960 and 1980, these decidedly antagonistic views twice worked to 
regularize the status of mental illness. First, the mentally ill person’s incapacity was 
relativized in such a way that psychic affection came to seem less aberrant. Later, and 
symmetrically, psychic disorders acquired the status of a risk or vulnerability likely to affect 
any and all individuals. But this process rapidly ran up against a series of impossibilities. How 
could pathology be distinguished from being bewildered and distraught; i.e., two of the most 
ordinary social emotions? How could treatment expansion be contained within reasonable 
bounds without undermining the aspiration to well-being? 
 
The present two-part study seeks to explain how these questions were handled. The first 
part presents a synthesis based on my comprehensive reading of socio-historical studies of 
psychiatry in post-war America—the first part of the research. The substantial number of such 
studies done in the last ten years allows us to form a more exact picture of medicalization in 
this sector. Most importantly, the studies underline the paradoxical effect of the social interest 
elicited by psychopathology. From 1950 to 1980 that movement played its part in the 
remarkable growth of therapeutic activity, though it did so primarily outside of and against 
psychiatric treatment (Abott 1988). What enabled psychiatry to reconquer influence in the 
early 1980s was the set of nosographic standards it developed, the famous Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition (DSM-III). This historical material 
provides a frame for the second part of the research, presented in the second part of the 
article: an analysis of the five-axis structure of the DSM-III and of decisive stages in its 
construction. The analysis makes it possible to show that psychiatry regained authority in 
large part due to the negotiation and reconciliation role it played at this juncture. Specifically, 
the standards offered a means of separating out both health and pathology from social 
normality. This in turn permitted psychiatric diagnosis to become associated with a less 
contradictory defense of the individual.  
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1. Regularizing psychic disorders: professional organization and division of labor in 
the mental health field, 1950-1980 
 
1.1 The two faces of disinstitutionalization 
 
In 1963, the United States Congress passed the “disinstitutionalization” law (Grob 
1983, Grob 1991, Shorter 1997, Menninger and Nemiah 2000), thereby putting an end to 
construction of mental asylums and limited the vocation of public psychiatric hospitals to 
treatment of chronic disease. The creation of Community Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) 
under the jurisdiction of the states was an attempt to counterbalance the effects of this policy 
by facilitating treatment of the mentally ill persons in open structures and promoting their 
social integration. The effects of the legislation were considerable: from 1955 to 1988, the 
number of patients admitted to psychiatric hospitals plummeted by nearly 80% while the 
annual volume of treated cases increased fivefold (Shorter 1997). This development reflects 
the growth of the private hospitalization sector and the rise of local treatment arrangements. 
But the extensive development of treatment, particularly of community structures, primarily 
benefited persons with only slight pathologies. For the vast majority of destitute psychotic 
patients, disinstitutionalization meant being deprived of care. The chronic overcrowding of 
public hospitals and the invention of psychotropic drugs were major forces behind the policy 
decision to curtail use of state asylums. But that policy also echoed the demands of former 
patients and the civil rights movement, all generally associated with 1960s anti-psychiatry.  
 
The asylum approach had rejected the notion of the patient’s free will; it was therefore 
compatible with the recommendation that the patient be removed from society. According to 
the parens patriae doctrine, confinement guaranteed protection of both society and the 
patient, and it was up to the state to ensure that the patient received appropriate treatment. In 
1975 it was determined that a patient who had committed an offense fell under police and 
judicial jurisdiction. As someone endowed with will, he was now subject to trial.1
Paradoxically if indirectly, patient advocacy movements worked in favor of this change. They 
had first developed as self-help groups in the early twentieth century under the mental 
hygiene banner. The first struggle of patients and former patients had been against 
institutional mistreatment. In the 1960s they extended their demands to the area of citizenship, 
working to have the patient recognized as a subject endowed with legal rights. In the struggle 
against abusive confinement and shock therapy, these movements obtained a clause requiring 
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that patients be consulted and that they consent to the hospitalization decision as well as to 
type of treatment. In 1977 they demanded that patients be allowed to participate in evaluating 
the effects of the disinstitutionalization policy, alongside the National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH). This joint evaluation was at the origin of the 1986 legislation entitled 
Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act.2
In the 1980s there was much dissent within the anti-psychiatry movement. For the 
most radical, who were in line here with the “consumer survivor movement,” mental illness 
did not exist. They rejected pharmaceutical therapies and contested the legitimacy of the 
psychiatric profession. This part of the movement opted to promote alternative care organized 
outside the medical system. Lacking resources, it ran out of steam in the 1990s. In striking 
contrast to the anti-psychiatry movement, other organizations were able to develop just as 
radical a critique of psychiatry in the name of mental illness. The post-war context offered 
new legitimacy to environmental approaches to psychic affection. The substantial increase in 
what Kardiner called “the traumatic neuroses of war” among soldiers seemed to corroborate 
the mental hygiene theses that had been developed in response to the Great Depression. In this 
understanding, any individual confronted with intense life events is susceptible to developing 
a mental affection (Pols 2001, Barke et al. 2000, Young 1995). This viewpoint requires 
conceiving of psychic disorder in terms of shared vulnerability and seems to suggest the 
relevance of vastly enlarging the scope of health policy. Moreover, the mental hygiene 
contingent was pleading for use of prophylactic action, claiming that “healthy” subjects 
needed preventive treatment for the traumatism they were likely to undergo upon contact with 
social life. In this sense, the movement envisioned confinement to an asylum as an artificial 
means of protecting patients against the life conditions that were at the source of their 
disorder; it therefore favored an in situ treatment policy. 
 
These demands, made either to defend patients directly or prevent the development of 
pathology, generally went together with approval of disinstitutionalization. But in the first 
case, the patient’s right to autonomy required explicit rejection of any idea of disorder or 
medicalization, with the risk of reducing treatment to the barest minimum. In the second, the 
notion of mental illness seemed on the contrary to work as a lever for achieving recognition of 
the individual’s vulnerability and a right to protection against the aggressions of social life, 
with the related risk of a particularly inflated and inflationist mental health policy.3 This was 
the drawback of legally conferring the role of expert on users of treatment arrangements and 
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structures. Curative action as practiced in the area of mental health now concerned the 
patient’s personal feelings and thus created an entirely new kind of user demand and 
knowledge. This in turn worked against the monopoly logic by which any activity sector 
becomes professionalized (Abott, 1988). Therapeutic action broadened the spectrum of 
psychic complaint to include the entire domaine of ill-being, while making reception and 
eligibility of that complaint more complex. Diagnosis of it could no longer be left up to the 
therapist alone, as it had been, nor delegated entirely to the competence of the individual.  
 
1.2 Apogee and decline of clinical psychiatry 
During the 1930s, psychiatry enjoyed solid standing within medical science due to its 
alliance with neurology. This association enabled it to hold its own against the liberal practice 
then developing in the United States outside the profession, practice strongly influenced by 
psychoanalysis. Psychiatric research, which was receiving neither state nor foundation 
funding, remained entirely embryonic. The profession’s institutional standing, forged by 
medical schools and hospital practice, was compatible with approach diversity but was 
nonetheless dominated by psychobiology and shock therapies (insulin therapy, electroshock 
therapy, etc.). After the war, public receptiveness to the theme of mental health gave rise to a 
new demand: psychiatric treatment centered around psychotherapy.4
The NIMH, founded in 1946, used the better part of its financial resources through the 
mid-60s to train new practitioners to meet this demand. Above and beyond the Ph.D. in 
medicine required by the psychiatric profession, the policy promoted a training approach 
strongly marked by psychoanalysis.5 Psychic health was then an integral part of treatment in 
general hospitals as well—this was the apogee of clinical work. “Liaison psychiatry”, 
invented during the 1930s, was on the rise. In addition to the goal of reducing disease, this 
approach aimed to orient hospital treatment toward treatment of the person as a whole 
(Laurence and Weisz 1998). Psychiatrists were called upon to train physicians in relational 
techniques. They set up interface services in hospitals to ensure that patients were listened to 
before being operated on, that they were followed up on, and that any psychopathology was 
detected. But the central role thus granted to clinical psychiatry could not resist against 
opposition from the medical corps. To preserve their position, doctors denounced the negative 
influence that the psychotherapeutic approach was likely to have on patient health because of 
the rapprochement it suggested between hospital and asylum. Meanwhile, psychotherapy 
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sharpened divisions among psychiatrists by giving priority to the individual over the 
pathology.  
 
The critique of the psychiatric institution, intensified by sociologists at the turn of the 
1960s, had a devastating effect on the profession, especially since much of the criticism came 
from clinicians themselves. The debates roiling the profession at the time included the 
question of how to characterize mental affection. On one hand there were the arguments that 
denied psychic disorders the status of illness, preferring to represent them in terms of 
disturbed personal development. Some of these perspectives had in common the idea that the 
origin of dysfunction is social, and on this basis denounced the pathogenic role of institutions 
or the market economy (Laing 1965, Horney 1950, Crossley 1998). Other lines of argument 
included a refusal to attribute the status of affection to development disorders. Some 
clinicians, following Eysenck in his opposition to psychoanalysis, claimed that many neuroses 
partook of a “pathology of existence”; i.e., they amounted to normal conduct which there was 
no cause to treat (Eysenck 1975). This understanding, frequent among psychiatrists convinced 
of the biological etiology of mental disorders, went together with opposition to what was 
considered excessive psychiatric intervention in social life. But it can also be deduced from 
opposition to the idea that mental illness exists. Characterizing behavior in pathological terms 
was also seen as a way of exonerating the individual, allowing him not to face his 
responsibilities or obligations (Szasz 1964). In this sense the point was not merely to 
denounce arbitrary medicalization but also to critique the excessive legitimacy that the 
complaint of ill-being seemed to have acquired.  
 
This question was in part dealt with through the new community treatment structures. 
Through the need they created for massive recruitment of psychologists and social workers, 
these structures worked to demedicalize treatment and consequently to diminish psychiatric 
authority.6 This recomposition of the professional structure was facilitated by the legislative 
void in the United States around the practice of psychotherapy. Despite demands from 
psychiatrists and psychologists, no official title or training requirements have ever constrained 
psychotherapeutic practice there (Buchanan 2003). The decline of the profession was further 
accentuated in the early 1970s with the development of health insurance and the introduction 
of psychotropic drugs: a major percentage of treatment once given by mental health 
professionals was now being given by general practitioners. This way of handling the problem 
attests directly to the remedicalization movement, which was beginning to gain the upper 
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hand in characterization and treatment of mental affection. This process was not necessarily 
favorable to expansion of psychiatric practice since it worked first and foremost to 
substantiate the general medicine supply source,7 but it actually turned out to be decisive in 
reestablishing the authority of the discipline. For with the development of therapeutic drugs, 
psychiatry could move into science, and accede to research funding, at the intersection of 
biology of the brain and psychopharmacology (Healy 1997). Moreover, the substantial 
increase in number of persons treated enabled psychiatry to claim the expert position. In 
response to the diffusion of wishes and expectations relative to psychiatric treatment, the 
profession was soon called upon to guarantee both patients and practitioners reimbursement 
for drugs and therapy sessions (Barton 1987) The fact is that public policy, which in the 1960s 
set about managing the explosion in treatment user and market sector demand, favored a 
specifically medical approach (Marks 1997), and this in turn functioned as an endorsement of 
psychiatry’s claims to a monopoly in the area of diagnosis.  
 
1.3 Administrative and market third parties 
 
In the absence of universal public health insurance in the United States, the matter of 
reimbursement was subject on the one hand to the power games of private insurance 
companies, on the other to the sharing out of administrative responsibility for welfare aid 
between the federal and local echelons. In the late 1940s, the private health insurance market 
was booming due to a tax incentive policy encouraging employer participation and 
consequently reducing contract costs for individuals. This expansion did not benefit 
psychiatry since the insurance companies at first intended to cover only duly qualified 
pathologies for which drug therapy was available. Overcautiousness in the market sector, 
reduced hospital supply, and treatment decentralization thus worked to favor the development 
of a highly differentiated treatment payment system: payment for psychotherapy was in large 
degree left to private initiative, whereas treatment for the most chronic psychic affections 
continued to be publicly funded but in a way that was both more costly and more selective 
than before. The scarcity of state structures and the fact that hospital costs were only 
reimbursed if the patient had private insurance coverage reduced poor people’s access to 
treatment. Meanwhile, the public Medicare and Medicaid welfare programs, created in 1966 
to cover the health needs of the elderly and the poor respectively, were not successful either in 
making treatment more widely available or reducing spending. At the end of the 1970s, the 
state was covering more than 40% of all mental health treatment costs.8
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In 1980, in response to growing mental health expenses, the federal government 
moved to increase the cost to users of seeking treatment, either by requiring increased 
participation from employers or requiring users to take out complementary coverage. 
Moreover, hospital funding in this area was from then on organized not on the basis of 
projected budget costs but reimbursement for treatment. In 1983, budget allocation was 
indexed on Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs), a criteriology developed on the basis of a 
national sample of the hospitalized population. The system was made up of 500 clinical 
groups; for each group a standard length of hospital stay and intervention level was calculated 
(Menninger and Nemiah 2000). Budget logic that implies breaking down treatment into its 
various components may be valid for surgery, but it only imperfectly applies to the set of 
dimensions involved in psychiatric treatment. Likewise Medicare gave first priority to 
somatic pathologies; mental health only figured among treatments for neurological affections, 
first and foremost Alzheimer’s disease. In 1987, this restriction was dropped and treatment for 
psychic disorders began to be covered at the going pathology rate of 80% (of a pre-set annual 
expenses ceiling). Under the term Medical Management, Medicare was now applying a 
restrictive definition of medical practice that limited it to the acts of prescribing, pursuing, and 
modifying therapeutic arrangements. The program thus aimed above all at prescription drug 
management. While that principle did not exclude psychotherapy, the reimbursement rate for 
it was only 50%.  
 
The American policy approach to mental illness attests to the federal administration’s 
intention to have the society pay part of the costs of psychiatric treatment, in the same way as 
it set limits on the expansion of personal insurance through a series of arbitrated decisions. 
With cost rationalization we have the introduction of administrative standardization, a 
standardized decision-making procedure using accounting logic. By then general recognition 
of mental illness had subjected the psychiatric profession to a set of rival expert opinions: 
personal, professional, disciplinary, etc. Now bureaucratic regulation aggravated this status 
drop while facilitating affirmation of a new body of expertise within the discipline; namely, 
symptomatology and therapy evaluation. The principle of rationally managing reimbursement 
for mental health treatment implied a standardized nomenclature of disorders (Berg, 1997).9
Meanwhile, in the field of biological and pharmacological experimentation there was demand 
for comparable inclusion criteria, and therefore also for diagnosis standardization. 
Standardization thus ultimately amounted to regulations for evaluation, and constituted a 
10
10
space that lent itself well to resolution of the conflicts created by the problem of how to 
designate mental disorders. Standardization worked to institutionalize a new frame of 
reference and action, one capable of guiding and unifying the new policy orientation of the 
American Psychiatric Association and the strategies of minority representatives and patient 
associations. This is one way of understanding the enormous success of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Third Edition, published in 1980 (APA 1980).  
 
2. Health, between treatment and well-being: the structure of the DSM-III  
 
DSM-III categories are meant to be both impersonal and generalizable; in this respect 
they are perfectly, and deliberately, consistent with bureaucratic universalism. Through its 
scientific orientation, the manual also claims to represent an instrument of independent, 
neutral judgment, and to have resolved through proof the tensions generated by the task of 
discriminating among mental disorders. This is an excessive claim. No classification can be 
natural; that is, the equivalent of the real (Bowker 1999). All classifications are founded on an 
architecture; i.e., a interpretive hypothesis or at very least an anticipation of reality. A 
sufficiently explicit hypothesis or anticipation can be compared to the facts and possibly 
recognized as likely, plausible. A remarkable feature of the DSM-III is that the architectural 
elements were not fit together through a unified interpretation of pathology; the manual is 
overtly atheoretical.10 Still, the nomenclature is informed by a logical structure. And though 
that structure was not made explicit by the manual, it did introduce a series of new 
distinctions. To understand their meaning, it is useful to consider the conflicts generated—and 
resolved—by the work of determining these standards. The way homosexuality was delisted 
is particularly exemplary of how the psychiatric paradigm was being restructured.  
 
2.1 Delisting homosexuality: prefiguration of a model 
 
Sharp tensions punctuated the drafting of the Manual, particularly because its designers 
had rallied to a categorialist, endogenous vision of mental affection (Blashfield 1984). In 
contrast to dimensionalism, a view supported by psychologists where the assumption is that 
psychopathology is diffused through the population as a whole to varying degrees, the 
assumption of categorialism is that psychic disorders involve traits that are discrete entities 
common to certain individuals only. From this perspective, the standardizers of psychiatric 
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diagnosis had to consider three points: whether the traits listed did indeed define an atypical 
phenomenon; if that specificity manifested itself through a difficulty or deficiency; and if it 
actually attested to a psychic affection.  
 
The conflict that developed between the American Psychiatric Association and 
representatives of gay movements in the early 1970s brings to light the terms in which it 
proved possible to negotiate this issue. In the DSM–II, published in 1968, homosexuality had 
been listed as a sexual orientation disturbance and therefore classified as a mental pathology. 
During the 1970 APA Convention, a number of activists, first among them members of what 
is now the Association of Gay and Lesbian Psychiatrists, contested this determination, 
claiming that homosexuality represented a normal variant of sexuality. Psychoanalysts, who 
were in the majority in the APA, were against delisting homosexuality. To resolve the crisis, 
Robert Spitzer, chief editor of the Manual, argued as follows: accepting the arguments of the 
gay movement, he noted that scientific data did not allow for identifying homosexual 
behavior as a biological dysfunction; above all—and here he cited the activists’ experience—
being homosexual was not an obstacle to well-being (Bayer 1981, Kirk and Kutchins 1992). 
Spitzer’s idea was to plead in favor of delisting homosexuality while maintaining the 
possibility that it could represent a source of suffering. He proposed creating a new diagnosis, 
“ego-dystonic homosexuality,” and reserving application of it to subjects who were 
uncomfortable with their identity. This proposal was unanimously accepted by the APA 
Administrative Board in 1973.11 
The way this conflict was handled and resolved is exemplary in that it managed to 
integrate the entire set of dimensions understood by the profession to be health-related: 1) it 
gave a foothold to social legitimation of homosexual identity by recognizing it as a full-
fledged expression of individual autonomy; in this sense, psychiatry was acknowledging that 
its diagnosis should not produce a stigma that could undermine a legitimate claim to well-
being; 2) though the way the conflict was handled reflected acceptance of the idea that the 
subject’s full and positive development could constitute a health criterion, ill-being was not 
recognized as a pathology criterion. The idea in the Manual is that case studies would allow 
for understanding how homosexual identity may give rise to psychic suffering and therefore 
appropriately lead to treatment, particularly psychotherapeutic treatment. However, such 
expressions of distress also legitimated the decision to abandon categorization of 
homosexuality as a pathology: first, their singularity forbade all generalization; second, the 
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Manual purported to relate mental affection to physiological incapacity, and the dissonance or 
lack of self-fulfillment expressed by individuals seeking psychiatric therapy could not be 
confused with any such incapacity.  
This modus vivendi attests not only to the possibility of sporadic alliances between 
physiologist and subjectivist orientations but governs the structure of the DSM-III as a whole. 
Constructed on the basis of just this play of constraints, the Manual bears the mark of a 
negotiated order, just as it worked, by its diffusion, to institutionalize that order. The most 
immediate effect of this labor of composition was to generate the notion of mental affection as 
relative incapacity.  
 
2.2 Neither healthy nor sick: deviance and conformity according to the DSM-III 
 
The architecture of the DSM-III is “multiaxial,” made up of five independent listings. 
According to the system’s designer, Theodore Millon, the sum of a patient’s ratings for the 
five listings should allow for making a general assessment (Millon 1983).  
 
1) Axis 1 (Clinical syndromes) lists psychiatric disorders (schizophrenia, 
emotional disorders, anxieties, drug addictions, etc.) and gives a diagnostic 
grid for each. The notion of syndrome encompasses the idea that a 
pathology is constituted when a disturbance in expression (behavioral, 
mental, or emotional) can be paired with a physiological dysfunction itself 
discrete, or suggests the presence of such a dysfunction. 2) Axis 2 (Mental 
retardation and personality disorders) lists psychopathologies or deviant 
conduct that are not considered morbid in the medical sense.12 3) Axis 3 
(Relevant physical disorders) lists somatic affections and is aimed first and 
foremost at producing a differential diagnosis; i.e., determining whether the 
patient’s behavior is due first and foremost to an organic illness. 4) Axis 4 
(Psychosocial stressors) lists environmental factors that might induce stress 
and suffering in the patient. The objective here is to evaluate to what degree 
patient’s living circumstances aggravate his pathological state or, on the 
contrary, may work to improve it. 5) Axis 5 (Level of adaptive functioning)
is designed to measure what degree of patient rehabilitation or integration 




The axiology of DSM-III represents a break from psychoanalysis. In DSM-II, the 
breakdown of affections into neuroses and psychoses was motivated by degree of severity or 
by degree to which patient’s perceptions was congruent with reality. The differentiation 
principle affirmed in DSM-III recognized pathology as signaling an objective capacity deficit 
regardless of the disorder under consideration. In this sense, the dysfunction that manifests the 
mental disorder and is motivated by it can in all probability be established independently of 
the circumstances or representations in connection with which it came into being (Blashfield 
1984). However, in contrast to a classic psychobiological reading of psychopathology, the 
Manual designers also accepted the idea that the endogenous economy of the psychic disorder 
did not affect the person as a whole. In other words, the nomenclature recognized the patient 
as an individual capable of determining his or her own behavior independently of the disease. 
Patient’s autonomy was in all probability only partially abolished by the disorder:  
 
“A common misconception is that a classification of mental disorders classifies 
individuals, when actually what are being classified are disorders that individuals have. For 
this reason, the text of DSM-III avoids the use of such phrases as ‘a schizophrenic’ or ‘an 
alcoholic’, and instead uses the more accurate, but admittedly more wordy ‘an individual 
with Schizophrenia’ or ‘an individual with Alcohol Dependence’” (APA 1980: 6). 
 
By logical extension, this perspective accepted the idea of pathology as a kind of 
damage of which the patient is not guilty, but did not for all that clear her of any 
responsibilities. The individual is the carrier of his illness, the occasion for it, but can still 
answer for his actions, as can the drug addict or pedophile. The attribution of pathology does 
not stand as moral exoneration or a substitution for identity: though on the one hand the 
illness does not deprive the individual entirely of her autonomy, on the other her 
irresponsibility remains partial.  
 
Axis 2, personality disorders, explicitly reflects this understanding, presenting a map 
of traits likely to be common to all individuals and that allows for determining to what degree 
the patient’s idiosyncrasy—in relation to this distribution—conforms to or deviates from the 
average. The deviations listed here are not established with reference to pathology but to the 
norm; more exactly, they are deviations compared to behavior that according to the Manual 
may reasonably be expected of an individual in society.13 Pathological personalities such as 
14
14
the “antisocial” or “dependent” individual may be given a type of therapy motivated by the 
expectation that it will correct their behavior.14 But by virtue of axis independence, the DSM-
III suggests that these personalities, though deviant, are no less healthy than others when 
considered in relation to characterized mental disorders. Inversely, this axiom allows for 
thinking that the individual affected by a psychic disorder is not necessarily deviant. 
Moreover, given that the patient is the carrier of his or her illness, the social context is not 
understood to induce mental morbidity. Under the term “endogeny,” the DSM-III makes 
determining mental disorder depend on individual physiology. This clause reflects an 
understanding of psychopathology wherein the social relation is conceived in terms of an 
ecology; that is, a context connected neither to the illness nor, earlier on, to the individual 
himself or herself.  
 
“On the notion of syndrome the Manual specifies: “In addition, there is an inference that 
this is a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction, and that the disturbance is not 
only in the relationship between the individual and society. When the disturbance is limited 
to a conflict between an individual and society, this may represent social deviance, which 
may or may not be commendable, but is not by itself a mental disorder” (APA 1980: 6). 
 
The manual thus clearly recognizes that the subject may undergo pressure from the 
milieu in which he lives, or fall victim of a stressful situation. Axis 4 allows for this 
possibility as well as the suffering that may accompany it. Once again, however, this distress 
is not identified as a pathology.  
 
2.3 Suffering, stress, vulnerability: the dark side of normality 
 
The distinction introduced by Axis 4 of DSM-III between suffering and psychic 
disorder takes into account the ill-being that may be generated by the condition of mental 
illness, and in this sense it echoes patient movement demands. But it also indicates that while 
this distress is often associated with the illness and may constitute a corollary to and even a 
harbinger of it, it should not be taken for a symptom, but rather occurs in addition to the 
illness.15 
“In DSM-III each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant 
behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is 
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typically associated with either a painful symptom (distress) or impairment in one or more 
important areas of functioning (disability)” (APA 1980: 6). 
 
This explains why characterizing the depression syndrome was so crucial in 
constructing the nomenclature (Ehrenberg 1998). Admitting depression as a distinct entity 
meant that it was possible to formally distinguish the depressive person’s pathological sadness 
from the distress experienced in mental pathology and also from the distress that everyone 
experiences due to the ordinary viscissitudes of human existence. The depression entity 
allowed for establishing suffering as a symptom, but it also designated the point beyond 
which this conjecture could not go. Depression could not be qualified beyond detailed 
observation of the patient and signs clearly indicating an episode (mood disturbance, 
psychomotor slowing, self-devaluation). Psychiatry was here affirming its expertise by 
applying a limit to diagnostic legitimation of ill-being. But it was also suggesting that the kind 
of depression that was qualified as “normal” in psychopathology was akin to an ordinary 
condition rather than a constituted affection, and thus that suffering and normality could go 
together (Marsella et al. 1987).  
 
Like the mental hygiene argument, this view contained an admission of fragility. It 
reduced by just that much the benefits to be expected from integration: conformity did not 
protect the subject from ill-being, or even from mental disorder, because the social context 
had no hold over the illness. Since personality troubles did not designate a mental pathology, 
deviance itself was relativized. The Manual’s disjunction of illness from transgression worked 
to reintroduce both into the body of sociality, alongside conformity, where they represented 
less an internal break than a continuum of mental states. In contrast to the pathology 
designation, normality included the possibility of full autonomy but also that of deviance and 
suffering. And it was the underside of the capacities conferred on persons, and of the 
performance ethic that generates the principle of those capacities: the healthy individual can 
exercise authority but cannot exonerated from responsibility for his or her acts or protected 
from possible suffering. In contrast to the view opened up by Freudian psychopathology in its 
time, the individual’s weaknesses and faults are no more what found the purpose of therapy 
than is catharsis its goal. As underlined by the expression chosen by contemporary psychiatry, 
the purpose of therapy is first and foremost “an improvement.” In this context, the value of 
treatment is above all to repair: it works to correct a neurological, behavioral, or cognitive 
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dysfunction, and there is no claim to produce dividends beyond that. Still, with Axis 5 the 
Manual also recognized a more positive definition of health. What is that definition? 
 
2.4 Social functioning and well-being: personal development as health ideal 
 
Axis 5 evaluates patient’s degree of integration or rehabilitation in the course of 
therapy or afterward. Impaired functioning includes patient being dangerous for himself or 
others—deviance is thus forefronted here. Average, i.e., partially impaired, functioning refers 
to situations where patient’s symptoms have a detrimental effect on communication with 
others: the impact of the pathology in terms of individual performance. Lastly, acceptable or 
satisfactory functioning corresponds to absence of symptoms, patient’s interest in work and 
leisure activities, and some enduring social relations: functioning is called normal when it is 
characterized by an asymptomatic state and integrated behavior.  
 
The notion of functioning introduces a certain correspondence between social 
integration and personal fulfillment. Most importantly, this correspondence signifies that 
improvement due to therapy is likely to improve patient’s social relations. It likewise 
underscores that effectively realized rehabilitation can bring about remission. Second, with 
the suggestion that personal fulfillment presupposes integration, it lays down a hierarchical 
principle. This is why deviance is deemed to work against well-being even more directly than 
pathology does. But the gradation here also applies to the improvement produced by therapy. 
Though patient remission favors integration, it does not necessarily lead to well-being. By 
extension, this principle tends to suggest that patient’s rehabilitation is a condition for his or 
her positive and fulfilling development but is not sufficient to produce it. This understanding 
is only possible if another entity, both separate and superior, is acknowledged, under the 
heading of well-being. Under that condition, conformity can be distinguished from fulfilling 
personal development, and treatment from a more idealized vision of health.  
 
The disjunction between treatment and health brought about by the theme of well-
being had a direct extension in psychiatry through the distinction now made in the discipline 
between improvement and mental health, or between mental health and positive mental health 
(Ryan & Deci 2001, Vaillant 2003). By the Axis 5 scale, individual functioning is deemed 
adequate when the subject, now free of symptoms, is engaged in social life and satisfied with 
that involvement. But that such functioning is normal does not mean it is optimal. This means 
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that normality, the normality of acceptable states, is not the sign of perfectly achieved health 
but rather of a low-threshold well-being. In 1990 for the DSM-IV, the initial Axis 5 gradient, 
which ranged from 0 to 100, was reduced to a range of 0 to 90. The highest interval was 
eliminated because it seemed to apply to subjects demonstrating positive mental health, those 
who functioned particularly well in all areas (Guelfi 1998). In other words, according to the 
Manual, optimization of individual potential is not a matter for psychiatric treatment, but at 
the same time it cannot be entirely ignored by the discipline. From a strictly medical 
perspective, psychiatry intended to permit the patient to reach a positive enough condition, 
compatible with his or her ideals and capacities. Above that threshold, it no longer recognized 
the patient as a subject susceptible of psychiatric treatment. But from a psychological view, 
the patient was still accessible to psychotherapy and its set of techniques for treating suffering 
and enhancing personal development. The quality-of-life or well-being theme thus marks, 
overall, the need for the clinician to take into account the individual’s singularity, and even to 
promote his or her full self-realization. Once this viewpoint had been linked to treatment, it 
outlined the contours of a kind of therapy that would be capable of aggregating improvement 
and personal development, medication and psychotherapy, biological and psychological 
approaches to psychic disorder, and of bringing together the entire set of mental health 
professions, despite the structural rivalries among them.  
 
* * *
The impact of this new frame of reference can be measured in various ways. First, it 
may be observed in the way perceptions of psychic disorders evolved. Phelan and his team, 
among others, analyzed the development of social representations of mental pathology in the 
United States by comparing data from a questionnaire distributed first in 1950, then in 1996. 
They concluded that the social body’s receptiveness to psychic disorders had improved: the 
majority of respondents now identify mental troubles as a risk that could affect them (Phelan 
et al. 2000). But the impact of the new designations of normality and pathology may perhaps 
be even better gauged in terms of how patient movement demands have evolved. In 1980 
treatment-user organizations, particularly patient family groups, began demanding recognition 
of the biological character of mental pathology. Marked by a consumerist orientation, these 
organizations demanded reimbursement for treatment of affections listed in the psychiatric 
nomenclature, and were opposed to coverage for people with less severe mental health 
problems, i.e., psychic suffering (Menninger and Nemiah 2000). This movement reflects a 
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reorganizing of the debate: it now involves not so much a series of oppositions shaped by the 
imposition of a unique framework as a permanent and continually negotiated intermingling of 
different representations of health. In this sense, current demands may be said to reflect less 
an interest in fighting treatment than defending patients’ or users’ active participation in the 
treatment process. This process requires psychiatry to respond to increasing demand for 
labelling pathologies, with the risk of its being perpetually obliged to negotiate its category 




When medicine’s relation to social integration or control is analyzed sociologically, 
the hypothesis of a transference is often cited: medicalization is understood to reflect a 
process in which moral responsibility has been entirely transferred, term for term, from the 
community to medicine (Conrad and Schneider 1982). This understanding is informed by a 
linear vision of social change, however, and does not allow for explaining why treatment has 
been at the core of this change. If on the other hand we consider the post-World War II 
demand for health, which gave rise to both increased treatment for mental disorders and 
critique of such treatment, we are in a better position to grasp the workings of the shift. This 
approach also requires us to develop a more complex image of medicalization, its context and 
organization. In fact, what has been at work here are intertwined but partially contradictory 
processes.  
 
In the United States, the defense of individual autonomy and subjectivity made it 
possible to recognize the patient as an actor in his or her treatment as early as the 1950s. This 
recognition relativized the externality of mental disorder, and went so far as to question the 
very existence of mental illness. But it also worked in favor of a conception of psychic 
disorder as damage and loss to the person afflicted by it, as well as a risk that could affect any 
and all members of the collectivity. This reorganization relativized the virtue of conformity, 
as it was no longer understood to protect one from mental disorder, while acceptance of 
morbidity risk reduced the normative aspect of illness and its possible identification with 
deviance. This shift opened the way for the affirmation that illness and ill-being were distinct 
social categories: the opposition between disease and sociality that had structured mental 




Defense of the self led naturally to a massive increase in treatment. But it also 
imported into the field of medicine a problematic that both enriched and complexified the 
notion of health. Through the issue of well-being, the notion of health no longer concerned 
mere improvement through therapy but extended to fulfilling development, self-realization. 
This ideal partially projected health outside the limits of treatment and freed medicine from 
responsibility for it. But that externality in turn affected medical intervention, by situating in 
the domain of respect-for-subjectivity a disposition potentially opposed to treatment. The 
increased demand for health is a means of understanding how contemporary subjectivism 
both fueled medicalization and constrained how it was organized.  
 
The fact remains, however, that neither the subjectivism that fueled criticism of 
treatment, nor biologism, the equivalent  of subjectivism in the field of psychiatric research, 
took into account the relational and collective dimension that necessarily impacts upon how a 
person is shaped. The idea of a “culture-free” self is quite simply unrealistic, just as it is 
highly unlikely that mental affection will ever be what the organic endogeny hypothesis 
claims it is, i.e., totally isolated from the social context in which it came to being. If we leave 
behind both these visions for a more strictly sociological reading of the facts, we cannot fail to 
see that “well-being” and “fulfilling self-development” do not refer to a state beyond 
normality; rather they constitute the very epicenter of conformity. Defense of the subject and 
the heath ideal that this defense has given rise to shrink social life down to the life of the 
individual. The pursuit of personal well-being has come to seem the response to a natural, 
ontological, or physiological need, whereas it is more exact to say that it reflects individuals’ 
scrupulous subscribing to the aims designated by contemporary society. In this sense, the 
demand for health is strikingly paradoxical: despite the way defense of individuality, 
elevation of autonomy, and interest in personal distinction all seem to focus attention on the 
individual’s freedom, never have they looked so strongly like moral obligations. 
 
1. From this date the “guilty but mentally ill” doctrine allowed for adding a measure of treatment to the 
sentence of a person officially defined as a common criminal (Simon 1992).  
2. The legislation requires states to ensure the legal defense of patients in cases of abuse or negligence. 




planning mental health programs in the individual states. For persons with a severe disease, the states 
must enable them to “maintain responsibility, to the greatest extent possible, for setting their own 
goals, directing their own lives, and acting responsibly as members of the community” (quoted in 
Menninger and Nemiah 2000: 307). 
3. In 1980 the NIMH conducted an epidemiological survey of 20 000 American residents (Robins and 
Regier 1990). Survey results show 32% of respondents suffering from a mental disorder in the course 
of their life, and 20% during the year before the survey. These figures reflect extensions to the 
nomenclature of mental disorders made during the 1970s. The data also reflect changes in ways of 
experiencing and expressing discontent or failure. It is reasonable to assume that diffusion of psychic 
complaint was fueled by the fact that dissatisfaction and injustice are today more directly recognized 
in terms of the impact they have on an individual’s mental or psychomotor vitality. Still, the results 
raise the question of whether this type of complaint is sufficient to qualify as a mental disorder. 
4. In 1957, no less than 14% of the American population had received psychotherapeutic treatment 
(Buchanan 2003). 
5. At the end of the war, there were 3,634 psychiatrists in the United States, a figure that increased 
continuously until 1985. By 1962 it stood at 13 000 practitioners; 18,000 in 1965; 25,000 in 1970; and 
more than 31,000 in 1985. The number then began to fall, and the psychiatry profession found itself in 
a recruitment crisis (Blashfield 1984). From 1940 to 1965, more than 50% of the psychiatry training 
curriculum focused on psychoanalysis. Meanwhile the analytic cure was a way of opening the 
profession up to liberal practice. In the 1940s, the majority of clinicians practiced in hospitals; in 1970, 
66% were in private practice (Shorter 1997).  
6. In 1950, psychiatrists represented nearly 25% of mental health professionals (nurses were over 
50%). With the development of outpatient treatment, psychologists and social workers are now in the 
majority. In 1959 there were 3,000 psychologists in the US; today the estimated number is 250,000, 
40,000 working in hospitals or clinics (Capshew 1999). In 1945 there were approximately 2,000 social 
workers practicing in the field of mental health; in 1985 they numbered over 80,000 (Shorter 1997).  
7. It is estimated that since 1980, more than 50% of patients diagnosed as having poor mental health 
have received treatment from general practitioners. In the US in 1970, the annual prevalence of 
psychotropic drug prescriptions—80% of which were made by general practitioners—was 10%; today 
it is over 20%.  
8. Medicare and Medicaid strengthened the public sector’s obligations toward persons over 65 (or 
suffering from a physical or mental incapacity) and the poor. The Medicaid program to cover poor 
people was run by the individual states, and it was left up to the state to decide whether or not to fund 
psychiatric care for persons under 22 or over 65. The states tended to choose not to pay, meaning that 




explained, had been being managed since 1963 in accordance with the policy for reducing receiving 
capacity (Menninger and Nemiah 2000).  
9. The instrumentation developed enabled the profession to impose an alternative to the DRG hospital 
cost assessment system. Since 1982, psychiatric hospital funding has been determined with reference 
to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). In this framework, the DRG system no 
longer applies; diagnostic evaluation is now done with reference to the psychiatric nomenclature. 
10. With the exception of components based on biological and pharmacological research, the manual’s 
demonstration of objectivity is deduced primarily from consensus metrology: it relies on interjudge 
agreement. The point was to assess convergence of clinical opinion in patient diagnosis, and the 
demonstrative undertaking was guided by the intention to overcome clinician idiosyncrasy. In this 
sense it was itself directly marked by the rise of subjectivism: the aim of overcoming the subjectivity 
and idiosyncrasy attributed to the individual (in this case, each clinician) became so strongly 
structuring that obtaining consensus was taken for the equivalent of proving (Sadler and al. 1994, Kirk 
and Kutchins 1992).  
11. In similar manner, feminist movements got the “self-defeating personality” disorder, inspired by the 
psychoanalytic reading of masochism, removed from the manual. The nosography had seemed to 
suggest that this disorder was more prevalent among women (Valenstein 2000).  
12. With the exception of “developmental disorders” such as autism and hyperactivity, which are 
included on this axis. The Manual allows itself a degree of ambiguity on this point: the term 
encompasses affections that are either discrete or likely to appear in childhood.  
13. The DSM-IV, which followed the DSM-III-R, could hardly be more explicit: personality disorders 
refer to behavioral modes that “deviate markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture” 
(APA 1994: 633). 
14. Among the 14 disorders listed in this area, the antisocial personality seeks to satisfy exclusively 
personal interest whereas the dependent personality is dominated by a compulsive quest for others’ 
support (APA 1980). 
15. The distinction made here between morbid and social factors reflects the decline of social 
psychiatry and the reactional hypothesis (Schulman and Hammer 1988). In the 1970s, 
psychopathology stopped attributing a causal role to life events; events came to be considered instead 
as precipitating factors, foreign to the morbid process (Guelfi et al. 1995). For a time at least, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) stood as the exception to this rule. That syndrome was integrated 
into the DSM under pressure from the Veterans Administration, which was trying to obtain federal 
pensions for Vietnam war veterans. PTSD was first conceived as a normal reaction to an abnormal 
situation. Since 1994 it has been applied to individuals who tend to develop a pathological reaction to 
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